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Wilhelm Jerusalem, the Social





1 The German edition of  William James’s  Pragmatism:  A New Name for  Some Old  Ways  of
Thinking was  published  within  months  of  the  original,  translated  by  the  Viennese
educationalist,  psychologist  and  philosopher  Wilhelm  Jerusalem  who  had  been  in
correspondence  with  its  author  on  matters  of  psychology  for  some  years.1 In  his
“Translator’s  Preface,”  dated  November  1907,  Jerusalem  wrote  that  despite  being  a
“sincere follower,” indeed despite having been himself a pragmatist avant-la-lettre,  he
could not  agree “completely in all  respects” with James.2 Being of  recent vintage he
expected  pragmatism  to  undergo  “a  few  important  expansions  and  also  a  few
corrections”:
For instance, pragmatism’s theory requires a very important complementation. In
particular it ought to be investigated historically what forms the concept of truth
has taken in the course of scientific research and in philosophical speculation. Only
then will  it  become clear and only then will  it  be understood that truth always
consists  in the leading and directing of  our intellectual  self  in a fashion that is
advantageous for life. Then one will also have to take greater account of the social
factor in the development of knowledge and cognition and attain greater clarity
about the nature of  historical  truth and the content and point of  the historical
sciences than the author of the current book has achieved. (Jerusalem 1908a: vi-vii)3
2 Even conceding that Jerusalem was talking about pragmatism mainly on the basis  of
James’s book, what might he have meant? After all, in Lecture Six, James twice recurred
to the social as of considerable significance: once, in pointing out that the foundation of
all of our talk of truth rests, like credit, on the fact that at least some claims are verified
by somebody somewhere;4 and once in stating categorically: “All human thinking gets
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discursified; we exchange ideas, we lend and borrow verifications, get them from one
another in social intercourse.” (1907/1991: 94). What more might Jerusalem wish for –
except perhaps an argument for why or how all human thinking gets “discursified”?5 
3 Well, that most likely was the point. Consider John Dewey’s later remark that, compared
to James’s highly personal approach to determining the meaning of conceptions and his
attachment to the will to believe, Peirce himself had “a more explicit dependence on the
social  factor.”  Peirce’s  appeal  was  “essentially  to  the  consensus  of  those  who  have
investigated, using methods which are capable of employment by all. It is the need for
social agreement, and the fact that in its absence ‘the method of tenacity’ will be exposed
to disintegration from without, which finally forces upon mankind the wider and wider
utilization of the scientific  method.” (1916/1925:  308).6 Jerusalem’s point was broadly
similar, for against James he meant to strengthen the notion of “objective truth.” That
notion  was  distinguished,  as  he  soon  put  it,  by  relying  not on  “the  intersubjective
criterion,  which  consists  in agreement  with  fellow  thinkers,”  but  on  “the  objective
criterion of the fulfillment of predictions.” While he conceded that these objective truths
also needed to be socially shared “to attain constancy and effectiveness” (1909a/1925:
150), it is not entirely clear whether this sharing was procedurally grounded (as with
Peirce and Dewey) or pertained only to content. 
4 What then did Jerusalem’s criticism of James amount to?7 The first thing to note is that he
talked about the need to consider the social factor more than it had been so far. That it
was noted at all to be as important in the respects specified by James was, I take it, one of
the things that Jerusalem found attractive in James’s conception. It certainly resonated
with his own ever increasing appreciation of the role of the social, as documented in the
relevant chapters of his Einleitung in die Philosophie (Introduction to Philosophy) being
expanded in later editions (1st ed. 1899, 10th ed. 1923). The next thing to note is where
Jerusalem thought greater attention to the social factor was needed: in the development
of  cognition  and knowledge. 8 Within  one  year,  after  all,  he  had  published  his  own
“Soziologie  des  Erkennens”  (Sociology  of  Cognition)  which  is  often  regarded  as  a
founding  treatise  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  and  prompted  Émile  Durkheim  to
inaugurate a regular section devoted to the topic,  “Les conditions sociologique de la
connaissance,” in his journal Année sociologique.9 It seems indicative of the tension within
the field that the next generation of practitioners of the new discipline of sociology of
knowledge tended to reject Jerusalem’s efforts as mere social psychology.10 These early
critics (there were no later ones as his pioneering work was largely forgotten) had a point
but they also overlooked something very important. This is the third thing to note. It was
not the accumulation of knowledge that interested Jerusalem, but the emergence of the
conceptual wherewithal required to have anything like knowledge in the first place. The
role of the social at the dawn of cognition and in the development of the concept of
knowledge itself was his topic. 
5 Finally we may note that Jerusalem spoke of the need to pay attention to both “the nature
of historical truth” and the “content and point of the historical sciences.” Here Jerusalem
pointed  to  the  ongoing  struggle  for  the  correct  epistemological  foundations  of  the
emerging social sciences and envisaged a philosophical anthropology on an evolutionarily
informed sociological and psychological, in short empirical basis. Such a program put
itself  in  sharp methodological  opposition,  of  course,  both to  neo-idealism and,  more
importantly, to so-called critical philosophy which considered the calling of humanity the
exclusive province of transcendental reflection. Jerusalem’s anti-apriorism was radical
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and unabashedly embraced psychologism and so occasioned discomfort even in staunch
logical empiricists and continues to do so in present-day naturalists.11 What must not be
overlooked, however, is that this created room for a broadly naturalistic approach to
epistemological matters. While I call his approach “broadly naturalistic” it must be noted
that Jerusalem was no materialist and he insisted on the distinction between Natur- and
Geisteswissenschaft. While he rejected the metaphysics associated with Hegel’s concept of
objective spirit (objektiver Geist), he believed that its content was spelt out by an empirical
science that remained irreducible to natural science. When he insisted that sociology (his
psycho-sociology or social psychology) provided the foundation for Geisteswissenschaft, he
sought to provide a scientific  framework within which,  without undue reductions or
naturalistic fallacies, a pronounced ethical idealism was to take root.12 
6 Like James, then, Jerusalem’s philosophy fell between standard positions still before he
became the German spokesman for pragmatism. What he sought to stress was that ideas
and concepts are Menschenwerk, of human hand, that emerged in history and that, since
(as his friend Mach had stated long ago) what history can do it also can undo, these ideas
and concepts were continually under construction and need periodic reassessment.13 On
this point, of course, he joined forces again with James as well. Fittingly Jerusalem ended
a brief review of Germanophone sympathisers with pragmatism with a quotation from
Rudolf Goldscheid, his fellow founder of the Viennese Sociological Society, who voiced a
very distinctive voluntarism of his own: “We must not rest – not until we have recognized
the  purposefulness  of  all  that  happens,  but  until  we  have  brought  about its
purposefulness.”14
7 An interim result: while we may leave open how much he advanced matters we can see
that Jerusalem sought to re-enforce the recognition of the role of the social in pragmatism. 
 
2.
8 It  may be noted that Jerusalem himself had already started work on the program he
outlined in his “Translator’s Preface.” Thus we may note that he happily accepted James’s
advice to translate as him freely as needed to get his point across. Where James spoke of
“men’s beliefs at any time [being] so much experience funded,” there Jerusalem has him
talk of these beliefs being the “Summe der verdichteten Erfahrung” (sum of condensed
experience). Likewise James’s “the whole body of funded truths” became “verdichtete
Wahrheiten” (solidified truths).15 In other words, where James used a term that resonated
with his concern with the “cash-value” of truth and his simile of truth living on credit in
order  to  indicate  the  experiential  well-groundedness  of  beliefs  and  concepts,  there
Jerusalem employed the notion of Verdichtung.16 These translations (and others) give a
good first impression what Verdichtung (a term with wide currency at the time) is about:
the retention of the content of a set of experiences by condensation or compression to a
representative minimum.17 
9 Here Jerusalem grafted a conception onto James’s pragmatism that he had adopted some
time  earlier  and  was  about  to  turn  into  his  vehicle  of  the  further  socialization  of
pragmatism. This was the complex of ideas associated with the concept of Verdichtung
that had been introduced by Moritz Lazarus and given a central role in his and Heyman
Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie. In his “Soziologie des Erkennens” Jerusalem was to turn the
original from Verdichtung simpliciter into soziale Verdichtung (social solidification). But it
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is the early stage that we must consider first; here is Jerusalem’s very first remark about
it:
This is what makes it possible to formulate in short judgments the results of many a
complicated train of thought: making what has been found to be the law governing
the events at issue into a constant mark of a new relational concept. Such concepts
are themselves the result of many judgments that preceded them and it is in these
that  the  thought  labor  of  previous  generations  is  condensed [ verdichtet].  Such
condensations [Verdichtungen] – Lazarus introduced this term – are often taken up
ready-made and […] as ill-understood slogans or empty knowledge of phrases can
lead to gross errors, even to calamities. For the progress of knowledge, however,
they are indispensible. Without them, all thought labor would have to begin anew
with every generation. (1895: 150-1; cf. 1902: 119)
10 Characteristically also, Jerusalem’s much later obituary for Ernst Mach (1916) did not fail
to note the use of Verdichtung his late friend had made nearly a quarter of century earlier
in his address to the Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. There Mach stated,
equally as physicist, philosopher and historian of science:
No  human  mind  could  comprehend  all  the  individual  cases  of  refraction.  But
knowing the index of refraction for the two media presented and the familiar law of
the sines, we can easily reproduce or fill out in thought every conceivable case of
refraction. The advantage here consists in the disburdening of the memory; an end
immensely furthered by the written preservation of the natural constants. More
than  this  comprehensive  and  condensed  [verdichtet]  report  about  facts  is  not
contained in a natural law of this sort. (Mach 1882/1986: 193)18
11 In  Mach’s  work,  the  concept  of  Verdichtung seamlessly  merged with the  principle  of
mental  economy (Denkökonomie) which  he  had  adopted  from the  economist  Emanuel
Herrmann in the 1860s and which provided the foundation of his own naturalistic and
pragmatist approach to epistemological matters.19
12 Note also Mach’s still earlier remark in History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of
Energy about the “difficulties [that] lie in wait for us when […] propositions which have
often cost several thousand years’ labour of thought are represented to us as self-evident.
Here too there is only one way to enlightenment: historical studies.” (1872/1911: 156). 
Mach’s comment helps us see the reasoning behind Jerusalem’s remarks about the need
to expand James’ Pragmatism. To be sure, we may marvel at and appreciate the short-cuts
of human cognition for their utility but we also must not be misled by naïve conceptions,
for instance, of correspondence truth, which may be encouraged by taking these short-
cuts at face value. (Thus Mach once admonished his readers not to mistake our thought-
pictures  for  the  things  themselves.) Preventing  the  “calamities”  incurred  by
misunderstood Verdichtungen required historical  study – indeed,  required periodically
revisiting  the  grounds  on  which  common  theories  or  conceptions  were  accepted  to
prevent the fossilization of doctrine into dogma – for which the kind of investigations
that Jerusalem was urging were providing the psychological and sociological foundations.
20
13 Jerusalem’s use of Verdichtung points to the social scientific research program that he
built on early on (just as in later years he was to call on Durkheimian sociology).21 Lazarus
and Steinthal’s  Völkerpychologie was a relatively short-lived and much misrepresented
scientific enterprise in the second half of the nineteenth century, which aimed to provide
both a  psychology of  social  life  and a  theory of  socio-cultural  evolution,  in  short,  a
philosophy of culture.22 To see what this theoretical alignment amounted to, we must first
consider Jerusalem’s theory of cognition in a little more detail.
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14 Jerusalem’s  “genetic,”  i.e.  biological,  perspective  on  knowledge  (his  term:  1899a:  75)
produced a distinctive psychology that considered itself opposed to Herbart’s psychology
(still dominant in Austria in the second half of the 19th century). According to Herbart,
mental life was accounted for solely in terms of representations and their interplay. Not
only did feeling and volition need separate investigation, Jerusalem held, additions were
also required on the cognitive side: an active psychological mechanism was needed to
impose a certain structure on the cognized material  as well  as social  mechanisms to
operate alongside it. In providing these Jerusalem built on extensions and corrections
which Lazarus and Steinthal had already made to the psychological theory of Herbart,
whom they otherwise revered as a path-breaking empirical philosopher, 
15 For  Jerusalem,  a  pre-linguistic  stage  operating  with  “typical  ideas”  (said  to  picture
biologically significant features of objects) was followed by a stage of primitive concept
use (by means of one-word-sentences) and finally by a properly judgemental stage. The
broad outlines of this were already given (important details discounted) in Steinthal’s
account of the emergence of language (1851) which, in turn, was portrayed by Lazarus as
developmental stages of human Geist as such (1857/1885, Chs. 2 and 4). What Jerusalem
contributed (besides the elaboration of the concept of typical ideas in 1902: 97-101) was a
constructive principle he claimed to have been the first to have properly understood, the
“basic  judgement  function”  (fundamentale  Apperception),  a  principle  that  allowed  for
progression  from  the  second  to  the  third  developmental stage.  It  consisted  in
interpreting every happening as separated into the two elements of a “centre of force”
and an “expression of force” such that the centre of force has ascribed to it a “will” that
wills the expression in question.23 “By separating the root [one-word-phrases, TU] into
subject and object we form, structure and objectivize the process at issue. Only then do
we begin to interpret it in a way that is conducive to our own nature so as to comprehend
and master it  intellectually.” (Jerusalem 1902:  107).  Originally formulated in his  1888
Textbook of Empirical Psychology this principle and the general schema received repeated
elaborations in later work.24 
16 Now  the  central  concept  for  Jerusalem’s  own  attempt  to  understand  the  cognitive
development of individuals and, more generally, human intellectual development from
prehistory onwards was, again, Verdichtung. Prior experience of the environment, keyed
to survival needs, was condensed first in typical ideas, then in concepts and judgements.
Verdichtung made cumulative learning, indeed culture as such, possible (in which capacity
Jerusalem came to term it soziale Verdichtung).
 
3.
17 As  noted,  Jerusalem’s  developmental  account  was  an  elaboration  of  Lazarus  and
Steinthal’s schema from the formation of non-linguistic proto-representations through
primitive concepts (roots or one-word phrases) to fully fledged concepts and all the way
to the common use of the concept of theoretical truth. For Lazarus, Verdichtung was one
of two basic psychological processes (the other one being representation: Vertretung) by
which  he  proposed  to  overcome  what  Herbart  had  called  the  “narrowness  of
consciousness” and make consciousness capable to handle ever more complex contents
(1857/1885:  247-51).25 The  first,  still  non-linguistic  proto-representations  select  only
biologically important feature and processes and combine in intuitions (Anschauungen) of
objects and states of feeling. Later on, linguistic ideas (Vorstellungen), which possess no
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intuitive content of their own, were formed to represent (vertreten) these intuitions by
being  associated  in  apperception  with  sounds  that  were  invariably  produced  in  the
company  of  the  intuitions.  In  this  process  the  linguistic  ideas  “distil  and  condense
(verdichten) as  an  extract”  the  intuitive  content  ( ibid.:  323).  It  was  the  interplay  of
synchronous Vertretung and diachronous Verdichtung that led to ever higher orders of
representation: repeated and iterated innumerable times this process lead first to one-
word sentences and after further differentiation – Jerusalem added his basic judgement
function here – to the properly judgmental stage. Only from that point onward did any
conscious  formation  of  clearly  defined  concepts  (Begriffe),  which  unlike  ideas
(Vorstellungen) give  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions,  become  possible.  Jerusalem
rightly praised Lazarus and Steinthal  for stressing that  “language is  by far  the most
important social factor in the development of knowledge” (1905c: 158), and added that
“only language allows the development of cognition beyond typical ideas to concepts.”
18 The  work  of  Verdichtung did  not  stop  with  the  provision  of  language.  Lazarus  and
Steinthal’s opening article for the first issue in 1860 of their Zeitschrift für Völkerspychologie
und Sprachwissenschaft pointed for illustration of the broad developmental dimension of
the concept of Verdichtung to “the comparison of the trained mathematician and the
beginner: what the latter has to work out most laboriously for himself in order to think it
clearly and safely, the former condenses (verdichtet) in great sweeps and still thinks more
safely, more distinctly and more definitely” (1860: 65).26 And in a brief paper dedicated to
its  explication,  Lazarus  distinguished  Verdichtung as  denoting  the  phenomenon  of
conscious  effort  becoming a  stable  disposition (as  in  individual  learning)  from what
accounts for the formation and transfer of social habits, customs, and a great variety of
other social and cultural phenomena.
We  must  distinguish  between  two  types  of  the  solidification  (Verdichtung) of
thought.  One  is  individualistic,  subjective,  such  that  the  solidified  (verdichtet)
product  of  thought  emerges  from one’s  own efforts,  one’s  own slow process  of
solidification (Verdichtung). The other is universal, objective, such that it is only the
result of a historical process that is taken into one’s mind. The former shows the
culture of the individual, the latter the public culture of an age. (1862/2003: 35)
19 According to Lazarus, in Verdichtung in the objective sense the intellectual labour of past
generations is laid down in concepts, (seemingly) self-evident judgements, also in firm
customs reflecting a certain moral standard attained by previous generations, or even in
works of art. Both subjective and objective Verdichtungen were accomplished (above the
level of typical ideas) exclusively with help of language, where, importantly, language was
conceived of not as a mere means of communication but as formative and indispensible in
the  development  of  cognition  itself.  Between  subjective  or  objective  Verdichtungen,
between the individual and the social domain, obtains an interaction that goes either
way: what are subjective Verdichtungen can enter the public sphere via their linguistic
representation, whereas objective Verdichtungen sedimented in language and ways of life
obviously have direct consequences via language learning and socialization. Verdichtungen
mediate the social and the individual.
20 Verdichtung, in short, is emblematic for the material process of mental-conceptual (geistig)
development.  It  would  lead  too  far  here  to  demonstrate  Lazarus’s  and  Steinthal’s
inheritance of themes and adaptations of ideas from the linguist Wilhelm von Humboldt
(“innere Spachform,” the inner form of language) or of the philologist August Boeckh (“das
Erkennen des Erkannten,” the re-cognition of what was known) who once named Steinthal
as the student who had understood him best.27 But it may be noted that with Humboldt
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they accepted as axiomatic the deeply social nature of linguistically mediated thought
and  with  Boeckh  the  ever  provisional  nature  of  interpretive  understanding  and  its
complexities  (he  elaborated the  hermeutical  circle).  Especially  from the  former  they
inherited a problem. Humboldt was unrivalled in his evocation of the role of language for
the human Geist, but what it all meant concretely was not all that clear. Just why was
language, as Humboldt argued, not just a means of communication for thoughts fully
formed by an individual alone, but instead the very medium for forming thoughts in the
first place, a medium that could itself only develop in social interaction and so allow
thought and the recognition of thought to develop? Clearly Verdichtung has a role to play
here. 
21 Now Lazarus and Steinthal too declared themselves to be no materialists – by which they
meant, I take it, that they were no reductive materialists. Lazarus (1857/1885: 80), for one,
declared himself for Fechner whose psycho-physical parallelism can be understood as a
non-reductive  materialism.28 Verdichtungen do  not  only  mediate  the  social  and  the
individual, they also mediate, Fechner-style, the mental and the physical. To be sure, even
Lazarus’s eloquent language at times strained to lend its customary dignity to rather
expansive flights of motivational idealism. But this must be stressed: the modus operandum
of  his  and  Steinthal’s  Völkerpsychologie was  decidedly  empirical  and  they  stated
unequivocally that their social psychology-cum-science of culture “could only take its
start from the facts of human social life” (1860: 23).29 
22 While  he  was  persuasive  in  resisting  thinking  of  Geist in  substantive  terms  and  in
outlining its creative force as the activity of thinking thoughts in virtue of the ability for
reflection,  an ability that only arose given language and linguistic exchange,  Lazarus
nevertheless  owed  his  readers  a  proper  theory  of  the  phenomenon  he  outlined:
Verdichtungen and its other, Vertretungen, as the means of complex non-sensuous or non-
intuitive representation, precisely not as transcendental but material conditions of the
possibility of rational thought.30 It seems only fair, therefore, to view Jerusalem’s later
efforts concerning soziale Verdichtung as an attempt to elaborate Lazarus and Steinthal’s
approach to what they called the objective side of Verdichtung.  Jerusalem stayed, as a
matter  of  fact,  within the paradigm of  their  basically  naturalistic  approach to social
cognitive  phenomena.31 (That  due  to  his  desire  to  distance  himself  from  godless
materialism Jerusalem chose to advertise his sociology of cognition as Geisteswissenschaft
must not be allowed to obscure this fact.)32 
23 Another interim result: Jerusalem and his völkerpsychologische antecedents appealed to the
social as constitutive of Geist in a naturalistic fashion. It was in the social domain of material
interaction that Geist developed and its customs were formed – even in all the normative
glory that Lazarus’ practical idealism bestowed.
 
4.
24 It must be stressed that the Völkerpsychologie at issue here is Lazarus and Steinthal’s own,
not  the  one  reduced to  collections  of  myth,  folklore  and customs in  earliest,  quasi-
prehistoric times into which it was turned by Wilhelm Wundt at the end of the century,
and certainly not  what  Nazidom made of  it.33 (What  happened to Völkerpsychologie is
comparable to the gruesome perversions suffered by Ferdinand Tönnies’s conception of
Gemeinschaft.)34 With Lazarus and Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie we actually have a science –
or better: a program for an empirical science of culture – that was practically lost among
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the battles to establish the social sciences in Germany at the turn of the 19th to the 20th
century.35 The name survived, to be sure, but already in Jerusalem’s time from the later
1880s  onwards,  virtually  no  one  practiced  it  as  a  science  derived  from Lazarus  and
Steinthal  and  certainly  no-one  practiced  it  as  a  science  in  the  sense  of Lazarus  and
Steinthal.  Jerusalem  himself  was  one  of  the  very  few  writers  who  remarked  upon
Steinthal’s passing.36 But while he was unusually ready to extend credit in the direction of
Steinthal and Lazarus, he too judged Völkerpsychologie in its original form to be passé. 37
One  mistake  Jerusalem  shared  with  others  of  their  successors,  like  Wundt,  who
compensated  for  their  unacknowledged  borrowings  by  misrepresenting  them  as
uncritical followers of a by then overcome Herbartian psychology, was to exaggerate the
difference between their psychological conceptions and his.38 In particular,  it  appears
that  Jerusalem failed,  in  this  respect,  to  distinguish  sufficiently  between Wundt  and
Lazarus  and  Steinthal  when  he  accused  them  of  them  of  undue  individualism  and
contrasted his own recognition of the social factor.39 
25 In  short,  Jerusalem’s  reception  of  the  original  Völkerpsychologie was  not  altogether
straightforward. That the connection is nevertheless significant and bears emphasizing is
shown, first, by the continuity of socio-psychological theorizing that I exhibited above. It
is also shown, second, by the idealist humanist pathos that is shared by Jerusalem and
Lazarus and Steinthal and animates their ethical philosophy, a pathos which, incidentally,
links both parties with the early cosmopolitanism of Herder and Humboldt. This was an
ultimately political,  orientation that,  tellingly,  was shared neither by Wundt or other
German successors of Völkerpsychologie nor many other representatives of late nineteenth
century German culture – but thereby hangs a story too long and complex to be related
here.40 Yet the connection between Jerusalem and Lazarus and Steinthal is important also
for still another reason and it is this aspect that I want to explore before concluding. It
concerns the question of how recognition of “the social” as important for cognition was
brought to bear on philosophy. It is here again that Jerusalem’s adaptation of Lazarus’s
concept of Verdichtung plays a central role.
26 Jerusalem frankly conceded that is a “banal truism” that the social factor is of importance
in  the  development  of  human  knowledge.  “We  all  know  that  we  receive  linguistic
communications from our fellow men and learn a lot in this way. And that scientific
research consist in a community of labour of ever greater comprehensivenss, that no
researcher  can  do  without  earlier  results,  all  that  hardly  needs  mentioning.”
(1909a/1925: 141) Wherein then lay the distinctive contribution of his own sociology of
cognition? “I will attempt to show,” he answered early in his first paper on the subject,
“that in cognition the social and the individual factor are always operating together, and
that the nature and validity of human knowledge can only be properly understood and
appreciated,  if  it  is considered in the light of social  development,  especially of social
differentiation.”  (1909a/1925:  140-1).  What  was  important  for  Jerusalem  was  the
interaction of the social and the individual factors. It is in drawing attention to the role of
this  interaction  in  the  cognitive  development  of  humanity  that  the  distinctive
contribution of Jerusalem’s theory lies. (His innovation did not lie in the provision of new
anthropological results but in the interpretation of what he found available.)
27 As we saw, already Lazarus distinguished between the subjective work of Verdichtung in
an individual’s concept and belief formation and the objective, socio-cultural work of
Verdichtung. Jerusalem’s elaboration of this scheme points out that what comes first is the
purely social factor. 
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Typical  ideas  contain  nothing  that  is  individually  determined  or  individually
colored. Typical ideas represent, by virtue of their rigidly determined tendencies of
reaction, the level of adaptation to the average environment of which the herd has
been capable to date […]. 
An important step in the development of conceptual thought is the formation of
language […]. The linguistic concept is an economic generality which again contains
an important social factor. All fellow speakers understand the word and use it in a
similar fashion […] that is what gives it its stability and efficacy […]. 
Typical  ideas  and  their  biological  generalities,  linguistic  concepts  and  their
economic generalities  are both social  condensations (soziale  Verdichtungen).  They
designate the degree of adaptation and totality of experiences of a human herd. At
this  level  of  development single  humans are  socially  bound in their  thought  as
much as in their volition and action. What is true for everybody is what is believed
by  everybody,  what  everybody  agrees  on.  This  holds  equally  for  empirical
judgements about the environment and religious ideas. (1909a/1925: 146-7) 
28 Needless to say, cognition at this stage barely covers what is needed for survival. “It is
only  when  human  beings  emerge  from  the  herd,  when  human  beingsbecome
individualized,  that  more  precise  instruments  of  thought  are  created […].  This  most
significant change in the nature of man is the result of the social differentiation due to
the ever increasing division of labour.” (Ibid.: 147). It is only at such an advanced level
that objective knowledge becomes possible.
The now independent human being is wont to liberate himself from the bonds of
social  solidifications (soziale  Vedichtungen).  He does  not  wish to  learn traditional
opinions about things, but to know the things themselves. He gives to cognition the
direction  towards  what  is  objective.  What  is  true  no  longer  is  what  everybody
believes but what is stated by means of careful observation and measurement of the
things themselves […].  The place of the intersubjective criterion of truth, which
consisted in the agreement of fellow thinkers, is taken by the objective criterion of
the satisfaction of predictions. (Ibid.: 149-50)
29 Jerusalem summarised his findings: “The social factor must be accompanied by the
individual one if true knowledge is to be attained.” (Ibid.: 149). But – and this is of great
importance – this is not the end of the relevance of the social factor.
The individual may have found a new truth all by himself and independently, he
may  have  irrefutably  demonstrated  its  objective  validity  by  the  satisfaction  of
predictions. But the truth can become an effective force only by being recognized
by other people and being acted upon by them. Objective truth too must become
social  solidifications  (soziale  Vedichtungen) if  they  are  to  attain  determinacy  and
efficacy. (Ibid.: 150)
30 Again we may think Jerusalem’s point a banality, but this would be to overlook the deeply
pragmatist bent of his philosophy: what is truth, if it is not an aid in orienting humans in
the world they live? To be so effective, Jerusalem rightly concluded, it must be socially
shared. And to be so effective in its distinctive way, unlike the haphazard way in which
mere opinion is effective, it must be objective – and this makes clear why despite his
admiration of him Jerusalem’s criticism of James was so persistent.41 To say that truth is
what works was just too simplistic, for what works may not be true and what is true may
not  work.  No  social  science  is  needed  to  see  this,  nor  is  it  needed  to  see  that  the
differentiation of truth from mere intersubjective agreement is crucial. But to see what
makes this differentiation possible for humans, Jerusalem argued, that is what only social
science, in particular his sociology of cognition, helps explain.
31 In addition, Jerusalem was able to point to still another but no less striking instance of
the  interplay  of  individualistic  and  social  factors  in  history  where  the  wider  social
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recognition of  its  outcome is  essential:  the  discovery of  the  phenomenal  realm as  a
distinct  realm  of  knowledge  which  in  turn  gave  rise  to  the  idea  of  humanity  and
universalist thinking.
The individualistic  developmental  tendency also […] opened up an entirely  new
field for thought and investigation that it had not been possible to turn into an
object of reflection at the stage of social dependency. This is the humans’ own inner
psychic  life  which  only  personalities  who  had  grown  fully  independent  were
capable and eager to explore. (1923: 297) 
32 For Jerusalem, the self-conscious, individualistic “inward turn” of thought (1924: 195) had
begun with Herclitus in Greek antiquity and led to the idea of humanity as such in the
thought  of  the  Roman  Stoics,  laying  the  foundation  for  the  universalism  of  the
Renaissance.  This  new  access  to  a  field  of  knowledge  that  in  a  previous  stage  of
development  had not  been recognized as  such,  provided not  only  for  a  quantitative
increase of knowledge but also for a qualitative jump in our knowledge of knowledge:
Descartes reached the firm conviction, based on his method of doubt, that in the
depth of his own consciousness there existed a source of indubitable certainty and a
guarantee  of  his  own  real  existence.  This  very  thought  is  of  a  strongly
individualistic character. Descartes did not doubt for a moment that his inner self-
certainty  should  make  itself  known  to  every  human  being.  The  individualistic
tendency of his thought thus immediately turns him towards universalist claims,
i.e. claims that hold for everybody. Only because of this is it possible for starting
from one’s own consciousness to become the basis of a new epistemology. (1923:
300)
33 The history of  philosophy itself,  Jerusalem in effect  suggested,  cannot be understood
without  understanding  the  interplay  of  the  forces  of  social  reinforcement  and
individualist  differentiation in the development of  human culture.  Descartes’s  epoch-
making work was itself a “sociologically conditioned” and historically contingent “bold
synthesis of individualism and universalism” (1924: 197). Care was needed in handling
Descartes’s  insight,  Jerusalem added,  for  while  it  was  responsible  for  “extensive  and
dangerous self-deceptions,” it also provided the basis on which to develop further the
idea of common humanity as an aspirational ethical  ideal and a self-chosen telos for
history.42 Like the idea of objectivity as universal validity, he argued, the idea of an ethical
universalism  became conceivable  only  at  an  advanced  stage  of  social  development
characterised by increased individualist differentiation in cognition – and required social
solidification (soziale Verdichtung) to become effective. 
34 Yet even the species history of truth and of ethical aspiration, as it were, is not yet the
entirety of the contribution that sociological thought can make to the development of
pragmatism, according to Jerusalem, for they join forces in the battle with aprioricist
philosophy. In his contribution to Max Scheler’s 1924 anthology edited for the Cologne
Forschungsinstitut für Sozialwissenschaften, a collection which marked the coming of age
of  the  sociology  of  knowledge,  Jerusalem  joined  his  own  work  in  this  field  to  the
polemical stance that already had marked him out in the impassioned discussions about
pragmatism at the International Congress of Philosophy in Heidelberg in 1908.43
Kant’s  firm belief  in  the  timeless,  wholly  unchangeable  logical  structure  of  our
reason,  a  belief  that  since  has  become  common  among  all  aprioricists  and  is
defended with much energy by the most recent representatives of this tendency of
thought  as  well,  has  not  only  not  been  confirmed  by  the  results  of  modern
anthropology, but rather has been shown to be in error. For this reason alone it
appears justified to try to replace Kant’s transcendental analysis by a sociological
analysis of the contents of human cognition. (1924: 183)
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35 Needless  to  say,  the  opposition  retaliated  charging  psychologism  and  conceptual
confusion.44 But note that when it is not the validity of formal logic, but concepts
pertaining to empirical matters that are at issue, then aprioricists have a much harder
task. Why should the contingent conditions for applying such a concept at all (never mind
the conditions of applying it correctly) not be relevant to understanding and using it –
and to efforts to prevent its misuse?
36 James’s very own depreciation of aprioricism and his emphasis of the “cash value” of
knowledge thus found support and confirmation in Jerusalem’s sociology of cognition,
which,  we  saw,  built  squarely  on  concepts  and  insights  developed  in  Lazarus  and
Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie. Their ideas were thus joined to battles fought long after their
Völkerpsychologie had become forgotten by all but a very few. Thus we can read in the
concluding paragraph of Jerusalem’s first paper on the sociology of cognition:
American pragmatism stresses the activist character of truth and with this point
touches  on  the  efforts  of  sociology.  Together  we  fight  against  philosophy’s
overwhelming  attitude  of  mere  contemplation  […].  Consideration  of  the  social
factor in cognition is well suited to remind all theoreticians that human knowledge
results from exercising the vital drives and that it is the highest and ultimate task
of a thinker to serve life. (1909a/1925: 153) 
37 If  readers are struck by a certain similarity of sentiment and wording of this closing
sentence with the final sentence of the inofficial manifesto of the Vienna Circle, written
by Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath with help from Hans Hahn and others (1929/2012, 90),
they are not alone.45 But the connection between Jerusalem and the Vienna Circle is even
more subterranean than that between James and the Circle, though it may well account
for whatever echoes of Lazarus and Steinthal’s work to be found in Neurath’s (“Ballungen
”). In any case, my concern here has been only to establish the first link in this line of
influence, between Lazarus and Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie and Jerusalem’s sociology of
cognition and the significant imprint it left on the latter’s form of pragmatism.
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NOTES
1. For a biography of Jerusalem see Eckstein 1935; see also his own 1922/1925.
2. For descriptions of Jerusalem’s and Mach’s philosophies as indigenous form of pragmatism, see
Uebel 2014 and 2019, and an exploration of the pragmatist sympathies of certain older members
of the Vienna Circle (“brought up in a Machian tradition”), see Uebel 2015. For a re-assessment of
Jerusalem’s philosophy and pioneering steps towards the sociology of knowledge, see Uebel 2012.
3. All translations of texts for which none are indicated in the bibliography are by the present
author. 
4. “Truth lives, in fact, for the most part on a credit system. Our thoughts and beliefs ‘pass,’ so
long as nothing challenges them, just as bank-notes pass so long as nobody refuses them. But all
this  points  to  direct  face-to-face  verifications  somewhere,  without  which the  fabric  of  truth
collapses like a financial system with no cash-basis whatever. You accept my verification of one
thing,  I  yours  of  another.  We trade on each other’s  truth.  But  beliefs  verified concretely  by
somebody are the post of the whole superstructure.” James (1907/1991: 91).
5. For other writings by Jerusalem on pragmatism for a German and Austrian audience, see his
1908b and 1913.
6. For a more comprehensive critique of James by Dewey, see his 1908. For criticism by Peirce, see
his 1905a and 1905b.
7. Note that whether Jerusalem’s criticisms of James’s pragmatism – based on the contents of the
book he translated – were correct is not the issue in this paper. My concern here is to locate
Jerusalem’s joint interest in pragmatism and in the social and then to investigate where it led
him.
8. The  German  term  Erkenntnis exhibits  a  perfect  process-product  ambiguity  that  Jerusalem
never bothered to resolve, therefore the “and” in my translation of “Erkenntnisentwicklung.” By
contrast,  the  term Erkennen as  used in  the  title  of  Jerusalem 1909a  is  weighted towards  the
process but the ideas developed there again concern the product as much as the process.
9. See Jerusalem 1909a, and Durkheim 1910.
10. For discussion of this assessment, see Uebel 2012.
11. For a thorough survey of the psychologism dispute in German philosophy, see Kusch 1995.
12. See, e.g., Jerusalem (1923: 359-65) and (1926: 3-17).
13. See Jerusalem (1909a/1925:145), Mach (1894a/1986: 138).
14. Goldscheid  (1905:  15).  What  I  have  translated  somewhat  freely  as  “purposefulness”  –
“Zweckmässigkeit”  –  could  also  be  translated  as  “appropriateness,”  “expediency”  or
“functionality.” 
15. See James (1907: 99, trans. 142) and (ibid.: 103, trans. 148), respectively. 
16. The terms literally could be translated as “thickening,” “increase of density,” “solidification”
or “compression.” It was translated as “condensation” when it was employed by Freud and Mach
and as “consolidation” when used by Fleck. (For references see Uebel 2012: Fns. 29, 39 and 41). I
shall use both “condensation,” “compression” and “solidification” in my translations below.
17. Likewise, James’ claim that “abstractions […] are so much past experience funded” became in
Jerusalem’s translation that in them “ist eine Summe vergangener Erfahrung verdichtet” (a sum
of past experience is condensed) (1907: 116, trans. 170); “the consummate factor of all conscious
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experience” is translated as “die Verdichtung aller bewussten Erfahrung” (the condensation of
all conscious experience) (ibid.:  17, and 19); and where James spoke of “truth-processes” – by
which he understood “worthwhile […] leadings” of the mind by ideas – as “primary verifications
arrested, multiplied or substituted for one another,” there Jerusalem has him talk of “verdichtete
primäre Verifikation” (condensed primary verification) (ibid.: 91, and 129).
18. Compare: “In nature there is no law of refraction, only different cases of refraction. The law
of refraction is a concise compendious rule, devised by us for the mental reconstruction of a fact,
and only for its reconstruction in part, that is, on its geometrical side.” Mach (1883/1960: 582).
19. On Herrmann and his relation to Mach, see Haller 1986.
20. See Mach (1894a/1986: 138) and (1894b/1986: 232-3).
21. See Jerusalem 1899b and (1922/1925: 2 and 18). In all editions of his Einleitung in die Philosophie
(which discipline, given his anti-aprioricism, took its data from the sciences) he stated that the
developmental approach to psychological phenomena led to sociology: “Not only man’s natural
environment,  also  the  fellow  humans  living  with  him  give  direction  and  content  to  the
development  of  psyche.  Thus  individual  psychology  is  expanded  to  social  psychology  or  Vö
lkerpychologie.” And he added that “this science” was “founded by Lazarus and Steinthal.” But
where the first edition still continued that while “has made progress in recent decades but still
has not yet found its secure method and boundaries” (1899a: 25), there the tenth edition spoke of
“great progress” and referred to Wundt’s multi-volume comparative work on language myth and
customs (1923: 23). For more on these comparative matters, see §4 below.
22. Lazarus and Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie has long been the subject of conflicting descriptions.
For  characterisations  that  guide  me  here se e  Köhnke 2003  and  compare  Kalmar  1987  and
Graevenitz  1999  who restored  Lazarus  and  Steinthal’s  Völkerpsychologie against  much
misrepresentation of varying sorts (including confusion with nominal successors; see §4 below).
As Köhnke put it: “‘Völkerpsychologie’ is indeed a psychology of social life, but at the same time it
is a theory of socio-cultural evolution.” (1990: 100). For a comprehensive critical appreciation of
the life and work of Lazarus and Steinthal that preceded the recent interest, see Ingrid Belke’s
ground-breaking  and  still  unsurpassed  (1971).  For  a  longer-term  account  of  the  fate  of  Vö
lkerpsychologie that casts much light on later practitioners, see Klautke 2013.
23. A faint anticipation of this idea can be seen in Lazarus when without further elaboration he
spoke of the “energische Beziehung” of different representations (Vorstellungen) as accounting for
the unity of a judgement (1857/1885: 273). 
24. See particularly Jerusalem (1895, Ch. 3) and (1902: 102-23), later, his (1899a: 77-80), (1902:
89-91), (1909a/1925: 142-3) and (1923: 86-7).
25. For the central role of Verdichtung in Lazarus, see particularly Graevenitz 1999.
26. Cf. Lazarus (1857/1885: 229-30) and (1862/2003: 27-8).
27. For the influence of Humboldt on Steinthal especially see Belke (1971: civ-cvii) and, of course,
Steinthal  (1851);  in  1884  Steinthal  published  Humboldt’s  Sprachphilosophische  Werke,  the  first
collection of its kind. For Boeckh’s judgement of Steinthal see Boeckh (1877: 68), for a compact
summary of Boeck’s work see Dostal 2016. Characteristically, Steinthal once spoke of Boeckh’s
philology as “the study of the historical development of humanity, the science of its developing
Geist” (cited in Belke 1971: ciii). 
28. For a detailed reading of Fechner along these lines see Heidelberger (1993, Kap. 2). 
29. Stressing their empiricism in social science is consistent with allowing for variation their
ethical theories in later years.
30. Belke rightly stressed that Steinthal regarded language as a “mental organ” and was less
interested  in  how  language  came  to  be  historically  than  in  “the  conditions  of  human
consciousness that force the emergence of language” (1971: cvii). 
31. As noted above, Jerusalem’s use of the term dates back to (1895: 150) where it is credited to
Lazarus. 
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32. See,  e.g.,  Jerusalem (1923:  219)  and  (1926:  3-17)  and  consider  his  dissent  from the  anti-
metaphysics of Mach whom he followed in all other respects in 1897, 1900 and 1916.
33. For incisive comparisons of Lazarus and Steinthal’s Völkerspsychologie with Wundt’s version,
see  Belke  (1971:  cxvi-cxxii)  and  Bunzl  (2003;  80-1);  for  the  descent  of  a  later  version  of  Vö
lkerspsychologie into  conformity  with  Nazi-ideology  Guski-Leinwand  2009;  on  Wundt’s  Vö
lkerspsychologie and the later 1930s version, see also Klautke (2013, chs. 2 and 3).
34. For a still relevant corrective account of Tönnies’s work against an image derived from its
misuse in the 1930s, see Bickel 1991.
35. Unrecognized traces of Lazarus and Steinthal’s conception of the social entered anthropology
and sociology in the work of Franz Boas and Georg Simmel (see Kalmar (1987, passim), and Bunzl
(2003: 81-4), on the former, and Köhnke 2003 on the latter); on the dimension of disciplinary
competition between emerging social sciences, see Klautke (2013, passim).
36. See  Belke  (1971:  lxxxi  Fn.  7)  for  the  relatively  small  list  list  of  Nachrufe.  On  the  quite
scandalous failure to mention Lazarus and Steinthal when they made use of their ideas by other
far more prominent philosophers and theorists of culture, see Köhnke 1990.
37. See,  again,  Jerusalem  (1895:  150)  for  the  explicit  reference  Lazarus  as  originator  of  the
concept of Verdichtung and Jerusalem 1899b for his knowledgable and, if not faultless, largely fair
assessment in his of Steinthal. 
38. See,  e.g.,  Lazarus  (1857/1885:  80  Fn.,  229 Fn.)  for  replies  (also  covering Steinthal)  to  the
charge of uncritical Herbartism; see also a telling quote from his lectures in Belke (1971: xx, Fn.
25). See Lazarus & Steinthal (1860: 70), and (ibid.:  3) and Lazarus 1862 for explicit statements
contradicting the charge of undue individualism. 
39. See Jerusalem 1899b. Jerusalem criticized Wundt’s lack of attention to the social nature of
language in his (1905b: 281).
40. It must be added at least at this juncture that Lazarus and Steinthal, like Jerusalem, were
Jewish, a fact that, amongst numerous other consequences, accounted for the impediments they
faced in their academic careers; see Belke 1971, Köhnke 2003 and Klautke 2013 on the former two
and read between the lines of Jerusalem 1922/1925. 
41. Still in the tenth edition of his Introduction to Philosophy Jerusalem was moved to remark in
retrospect: “Pragmatism did not realize the indispensability of the theoretical concept of truth
for science and because of it incurred many unnecessary disputes.” (1923: 83).
42. See Jerusalem (1923: 328-30, 350-1) and (1924: 204-6)
43. See Jerusalem 1908c and 1909b.
44. For  such  in-person  criticism  at  Heidelberg,  see  Mally  1909.  For  Jerusalem’s  view  of  the
ongoing debate, see his 1913, and 1914; for a general overview, see again Kusch 1995.
45. See Carnap, Hahn & Neurath (1929/2012: 90). For the pragmatist sympathies of members of
the pre-World War One “first” Vienna Circle, see Uebel 2015, and 2016.
ABSTRACTS
Ernst  Mach and Wilhelm Jerusalem may be considered exponents of  a  homegrown European
version of pragmatism. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the strongly social orientation
Jerusalem gave to his. Particular attention will be paid to some of his predecessors to exhibit the
relevance of a pioneering but largely forgotten type of social science for the development of his
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version of European pragmatism. Broadly speaking, considerations from Völkerpsychologie played
the role for the development of Jerusalem’s views that considerations from the history of science
played for the views of Mach. Of particular interest to us here is how these broadly sociological
ideas fed into Jerusalem’s philosophy and his understanding and appreciation of pragmatism.
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